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Back to the future? The limits of
neo-Wilsonian ideals of exporting democracy
DAVID CHANDLER
Abstract. International state-building has become central to international policy concerns and
has marked a clear neo-Wilsonian shift in international thinking, spurred by the leadership of
the United States and the European Union. Today’s approaches insist on the regulatory role
of international institutions and downplay the importance of locally-derived political solu-
tions. This privileging of ‘governance’ over ‘government’ is based on the assumption that the
political process can be externally influenced through the promotion of institutional changes
introduced at the state level and pays less attention to how societal pressures and demands are
constitutive of stable and legitimate institutional mechanisms. This article questions this
approach and analyses the transformation in the assessment of the importance of the societal
sphere. It considers how this shift has been shaped by current understandings of war and
conflict, and how the prioritisation of governance has fitted with critical and post-positivist
trends in academic thinking in international relations and security studies. The discussion is
illustrated with examples drawn largely from the Balkans and the international regime in
Bosnia–Herzegovina in particular.
Introduction
George W. Bush’s second term inauguration speech on 20 January 2005 may well be
looked back upon as marking the historical rejection of realism in post-Cold War
United States foreign policy.1 Far from being deterred by the debacle in Iraq, the US
administration has embraced a neo-Wilsonian idealism of exporting democracy and
liberal values in even more strident tones than that achieved by the Clinton
administration’s earlier forays into this domain.2 Just as Wilson challenged the ‘Old
Diplomacy’ of pre-World War I views of the balance of power, secret treaties and
imperial rule, the guiding principles of the Bush administration, mark a radical
rejection of Cold War realist approaches which were guided by policies of contain-
ment, narrow views of national self-interest and formal support for sovereign
1 G. W. Bush, Inauguration Speech transcript: ‘No justice without freedom’, Washington, 20 January
2005. Available at: 〈http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/20/bush.transcript/〉.
2 There has been a much commented-upon shift away from the realpolitik of the Cold War under the
Clinton and Bush administrations: see for example, A. Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An
Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); A. J. Bacevich,
American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (New York: Harvard University
Press, 2004); J. S. Blackton, ‘Neo-Wilsonianism in the Middle East: Democracy-Lite’, The National
Interest, 2:43 (5 November 2003), available at: 〈http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/
Vol2Issue43/Vol2Issue43BlacktonPFV.html〉; D. C. Hendrickson and R. W. Tucker, ‘The Freedom
Crusade’, The National Interest (Fall 2005), available at: 〈http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/
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equality and non-intervention.3 The desire for a more activist and interventionist
foreign policy in order to encourage other governments to reform and the willingness,
if necessary, to undertake military intervention in the cause of ‘liberty and freedom’
confirms that questions of post-conflict state-building and international attempts to
prevent and manage the consequences of state failure are set to remain at the top of
the international policy agenda. In the wake of 9/11 and the problems of international
intervention and administrative regulation in Afghanistan and Iraq, the international
engagement in, and management of, state capacity-building initiatives has become a
central problem to be addressed by international policymakers engaged in
democracy-promotion.
In the words of George W. Bush, the needs of national security and the desire to
promote American values across the globe call for one and the same policy: ‘The
survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other
lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the
world.’4 Not only are democracy-promotion and international state-building
measures held to be necessary to ensure the protection of peoples from the threat of
human rights abuse but also to prevent terrorist cells from operating with impunity
where states are too weak to police their borders and enforce the rule of law.
This shift towards a neo-Wilsonian internationalism has been welcomed by liberal
commentators, albeit warily, and as the UK liberal broadsheet, The Observer
editorialised: ‘If it had been John Kerry, the words would have been heard as a
welcome return to reality and an indication that the US wanted to engage with the
rest of the world rather than retreat into isolation’.5 By the end of 2005 there was a
much more cohered attempt to highlight the progressive potential of neoconservative
foreign policy with the London-based Social Aﬀairs Unit’s publication of The Times
columnist Oliver Kamm’s Anti-totalitarianism: The Left-wing Case for a Neocon-
servative Foreign Policy in October and the November 2005 Westminster launch of
the Henry Jackson Society with cross-party support for a similar foreign policy
position.
This proclaimed shift away from narrow national security towards global values
fits much more easily with European sensibilities, and the European Union has for
some years worked towards a similar international projection of power based on
liberal values rather than self-interest in the formulation of European Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For example, Javier Solana, the EU High
Representative for the CFSP has argued that European states’ unique capacities to
overcome national interests and cooperate peacefully through democratic institu-
tions, gives the EU a similar capacity to export freedom, democracy and good
dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod=Publications::Article&mid=1ABA92EFCD83486
88A4EBEB3D69D33EF&tier=4&id=27A11FC02EE349F79C030D5B59AF8260〉; L. H. Gelb, D.
Pipes, R. W. Merry and J. S. Nye Jnr. ‘The Freedom Crusade Revisited’, The National Interest
(Winter 2005/6), available at: 〈http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/
dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod=Publications::Article&mid=1ABA92EFCD83486
88A4EBEB3D69D33EF&tier=4&id=0BE693A9C9454A399042A6383A50C4A3〉.
3 See further, T. J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
4 Bush, ‘Inauguration Speech transcript’.
5 ‘Bush’s New World View is Welcome’, editorial, The Observer, 23 January 2005, p. 28.
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governance to the near (and not so near) abroad.6 This idea of the ‘real added value’
that EU expertise and guidance can oﬀer states outside the European Union has been
central to the legitimisation of a wide range of ‘democracy-exporting’ mechanisms
through the EU accession and the Stabilisation and Association processes.7
This interventionist desire, on the part of leading Western states, to shape the
political process to further democracy and reconstruct state institutions where states
are perceived to be ‘failing’ is in marked contrast to the internationally accepted
political norms and possibilities of the Cold War period where the geopolitical divide
between the Soviet Union and the United States meant there was little international
consensus on how states should be governed or on which policies they should follow
in the domestic arena. In the second half of the twentieth century, the reaction against
colonial practices meant that the United Nations upheld the formal political equality
of all sovereign states, regardless of their level of political, economic or social
development or of the capacity or willingness of their regimes to uphold the rights of
their citizens.8 Changed international power relations and changed political sensi-
bilities have meant that today there is much less of a divide between how states are
treated internationally and what they do domestically.
Despite the emergence of this new normative framework of international regula-
tion of, and intervention in, the domestic aﬀairs of states, there is a concern – even in
leading policymaking circles – that the development and assessment of the eﬀective-
ness of international practices in democracy-promotion and state-building has lagged
far behind this demand that international actions be undertaken.9 This article seeks
to analyse the most striking, and potentially the most worrying, aspect of current
international state-building policy practices whose goal is in whole or in part the
export of democracy – the downplaying of the centrality of broad social engagement
in the political process.10
6 J. Solana, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003.
Available at: 〈http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf〉.
7 European Commission, ‘The Stabilisation and Association Process and CARDS Assistance 2002 to
2006’, p. 9. Available at: 〈http://www.seerecon.org/region/documents/ec/ec_sap_cards_2000-2006.pdf〉.
See also, D. Chandler, ‘Governance: the Unequal Partnership’, in W. van Meurs (ed.), South
Eastern Europe: Weak States and Strong International Support, Prospects and Risks Beyond EU
Enlargement, vol. 2 (Opladen: Leske and Budrich/Bertelsmann Foundation, 2003), pp. 79–98.
8 See for example, United Nations General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’. Available at:
〈http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm〉.
9 See for example, R. Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and
Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation of
Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From
Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); The Conflict, Security and Development
Group, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change (London: Kings College, 2003); M. Lund,
‘What Kind of Peace is Being Built?: Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting
Future Directions’, discussion paper for the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa,
Canada, January 2003. Available at: 〈http://web.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/
10527469720lund_final_mar_20.pdf〉.
10 By political process, I am referring to the process of social engagement in the making of policy and
in the legitimation of government; the existence of a public sphere, through which the state’s
relationship with society is cohered. This takes place at a variety of levels and through a number of
diﬀerent mechanisms from media discussion, public debate and civil society engagement to more
formal political campaigning and the party competition for representation. It is through these
mechanisms that individual interests and concerns coalesce and a broader social and political
consensus is developed and variously expressed.
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Whereas in the post-1945 era of decolonisation there was an assumption that
state-building could not be accomplished by external powers but depended on state
sovereignty and political solutions decided by local actors – that, in fact, democracy
promotion meant less external regulation – today there is an opposite starting-point.
Today’s international state-building and democracy-promoting approaches insist
much more strongly upon the regulatory role of international institutions and suggest
that purely locally-derived political solutions are likely to be problematic. There is a
clear assumption that there are right and wrong approaches to the problems of
government – there is ‘good governance’ and by implication bad or wrong
governance – the assertion of a new ‘political correctness’ or of the benefits of
political science is one which seeks to legitimise the external regulation of states held
to be ‘incapable or unwilling’ to govern according to the accepted norms of those
states which consider themselves to have mastered the problems of the political
sphere.
One consequence of this is that the frameworks of ‘good governance’, overseen
and regulated by international bodies, are increasingly seen to take precedence over
the domestic political processes of government.11 This privileging of ‘governance’ over
‘government’ is based on the assumption that the political process can be influenced
by institutional changes introduced at the state level and pays less attention to how
societal pressures and demands are constitutive of stable and legitimate institutional
mechanisms. In terms of state-building, democracy and political autonomy are then
seen to be the end goal, rather than crucial aspects of the process of state-building
itself. The export of democracy is seen not merely to involve the removal of a
tyrannical or repressive regime but, in addition, the externally-guided reconstruction
of the political sphere of states intervened in.
The following sections consider this transformation in the assessment of the
importance of the political sphere for state-building, consider how this shift in
perspective has been shaped by a changed – and de-politicised – understanding of
war and conflict, and how the prioritisation of governance over government has fitted
with critical and post-positivist trends in academic thinking of international relations
and security studies. The article concludes with a more detailed discussion of the
limits of this approach with reference to Bosnia–Herzegovina, which has been under
an international administration tasked with state-building and democracy-promotion
for over a decade with the ten-year anniversary of the Dayton agreement in
November 2005.
State-building without politics?
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the domestic political process was generally
understood as key to the creation of stable and viable states. Samuel Huntington’s
11 Governance is a term which gives priority to the framework of regulatory controls, or the ‘rules of
the game’, established at an institutional level; government, on the other hand, expresses the
importance of the political process, ‘the game itself’, played out and mediated at a societal level. See
further, for example, P. Fudulu, ‘The Weak Institutions Syndrome as the Eﬀect of the
Cultural-Institutional Gap’, Indiana University Workshop Papers, 2003. Available at:
〈http://www.indiana.edu/wworkshop/papers/fudulu_041703.pdf〉.
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pioneering late 1960s’ study, Political Order in Changing Societies, was regarded as
the leading contribution to political development studies during the last thirty years
of the twentieth century.12 His concern was not the creation of states which had the
stamp of international approval, because the ruling clique supported the policies of
those in power in Washington, nor was he trying to design the perfect constitution for
export around the world, with a bill of rights, a separation of powers and human
rights protections.13 For Huntington, the key to state stability was a political
question of building a domestic consensus, a sense of political community, and
establishing a government with popular legitimacy. Huntington argued that bureau-
cratic rule or government by isolated cliques may be able to produce stability in
simple pre-industrialised societies but that modernisation and democratic, participa-
tory societies depended on the strengthening and institutionalisation of the political
sphere.
Political institutions could only cohere society if they emerged out of existing
social forces, if they represented real interests and real clashes of interests which then
led to the establishment of mechanisms and organisational rules and procedures
which were capable of resolving those disagreements.14 It was the links between
political institutions, political parties and individuals which were considered key to
strengthening the state, both institutionally and in terms of its popular legitimacy.
Although seen as a conservative by many commentators today, Huntington is worth
returning to by those who argue that international administrators can draw up all the
necessary legislation for state-building, democracy promotion and post-conflict
reconciliation. He argued that powerful rulers would always be tempted to bypass the
political sphere and present themselves as able to solve problems without the need for
politics:
Inevitably a ruling monarch tends to view political parties as divisive forces which either
challenge his authority or greatly complicate his eﬀorts to unify and modernise his country
. . . The modernizing monarch necessarily sees himself as the ‘Patriot King’ who is ‘to
espouse no party, but to govern like the common father of his people’.15
The desire of those in power to avoid popular accountability and to legitimise their
authority on the basis of being above politics and instead being a direct representative
of the ‘public interest’ will sound familiar to anyone who has read the statements of
the succession of internationally-appointed administrators charged with state-
building and democracy-promotion in the Balkans, for example, the international
High Representative in Bosnia or the United Nations Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in Kosovo. Bosnia’s High Representative Carlos Westendorp saw
the Bosnian Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly as
‘painfully cumbersome and ineﬀective’ when compared to the alternative possibility
12 S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
13 Huntington’s work was a response to the prevailing orthodoxy of 1950s modernisation theorists
who focused on the importance of economic reform at the expense of political concerns. In many
ways, his concerns have been revived in the ‘state-building’ literature, which has developed, in part,
as a response to the destabilising consequences of market-led economic reform programmes under
the ‘Washington consensus’ of the 1980s and early 1990s, which similarly neglected the importance
of state institutions and the political sphere. See, for example, F. Fukuyama, State Building:
Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books, 2004), pp. 6–7.
14 Ibid, p. 11.
15 Ibid, p. 403.
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of the swift signature of his administrator’s pen.16 Westendorp thrived on being the
unaccountable judge of his own policymaking, arguing that: ‘You do not [have]
power handed to you on a platter. You just seize it, if you use this power well, no-one
will contest it.’17 Lord Paddy Ashdown, Bosnia’s High Representative from May
2002 to January 2006, used very similar phraseology, for example, in his inaugural
speech, where he argued:
I have concluded that there are two ways I can make my decisions. One is with a tape
measure, measuring the precise equidistant position between three sides. The other is by
doing what I think is right for the country as a whole. I prefer the second of these. So
when I act, I shall seek to do so in defence of the interests of all the people of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, putting their priorities first.18
For Lord Ashdown, as for his predecessors, rather than facilitating consensus-
building between the three main political parties – representing Bosnian Muslims,
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats – his own personal perspective of ‘what I think is
right’ was held to directly coincide with the interests of the population as a whole.
This high-handed approach, which has marked the ten years of international
regulation in the tiny postwar Bosnian state, is at the centre of the neo-Wilsonian
state-building dilemma discussed here: the dilemma that imposing ‘good governance’
policy practices, alleged to be in the interests of all, inevitably means restricting the
importance of the political sphere of political party competition and policymaking by
elected representatives. This dilemma is increasingly posed in the post-Cold War era
when international actors have a much freer hand to impose conditions upon, and to
directly intervene in, states which are judged to be at risk of failure or to have failed.
The imbalance of power between intervening actors and those on the ground has
meant that while this dilemma has been acknowledged, there is currently little
thought given to the problems caused by this marginalisation of the domestic
political sphere. For international administrators and policymakers, it is well nigh
inconceivable that local actors could be better placed to take their own societies
forward than international ‘experts’.
For the international state-builders in Washington, London and Brussels, the
political sphere is a problem for strengthening state-capacity rather than central to it.
To return to Huntington:
The administrator opposed to parties accepts the need to rationalize social and economic
structures. He is unwilling, however, to accept the implications of modernization for
broadening the scope of popular participation in politics. His is a bureaucratic model; the
goal is eﬃciency and the elimination of conflict. Parties simply introduce irrational and
corrupt considerations into the eﬃcient pursuit of goals upon which everyone should be
agreed. The administrative opponent of parties may wear any dress, but he is less likely to
be in mufti than in uniform.19
16 Oﬃce of the High Representative Bulletin, no. 62, 11 October 1997.
17 J. Rodriguez, ‘Our Man in Sarajevo’, El Pais, 29 March 1998 (trans. Oﬃce of the High
Representative).
18 Paddy Ashdown, ‘Inaugural Speech by the new High Representative for Bosnia & Herzegovina’,
Bosnian State Parliament, 27 May 2002. Available from: 〈http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/
presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417〉. See also discussion in D. Chandler, ‘Bosnia’s New Colonial
Governor’, Guardian, 9 July 2002. Available at: 〈http://politics.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/
0,9115,751918,00.html〉.
19 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 404.
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For Huntington, leaving aside the acuteness of his observation on the link between
the military-mindset and the administrative one – captured well by Lord Paddy
Ashdown’s appointment to Bosnia, the ex-Royal Marine Commando never having
enjoyed elected government oﬃce – the point is that hostility to the political sphere
is essentially counterproductive. While kings and bureaucrats, who understand their
legitimacy as existing independently of society, are resistant to acknowledging it,
historically the engagement of the public in the political process, through party
formation and competition in particular, has been crucial to binding society beyond
its disparate component social groups, and to creating a broad social loyalty to a
state-based project which transcends parochial and particularist groupings.20 Against
pre-democratic, hierarchical approaches of interest coalition, which institutionalise
social fragmentation through patronage or the grant of private rights, modern
democratic states rely on the autonomy of the political process: the contest for
representation thereby forces political parties and interest coalitions to overcome the
fragmented nature of their societies and build links between diﬀerent social constitu-
encies. The more restricted the political sphere is, the less responsibility and
accountability elected representatives have and the less likelihood there is of political
institutions being able to build social bonds in divided societies.21
Huntington’s defence of the autonomy of the political sphere is rarely seen as
relevant to today’s policy practices in international administration. In fact, where his
1960s’ work is referred to, his points about the importance of strong state institutions
are taken out of context and these institutions are seen as being able to develop in
isolation from real political processes. A leading example of this latter approach is
that of Roland Paris in his influential book, At War’s End, published in 2004.22 Paris
critiques the ‘liberal peace’ thesis on the basis that international policy, which sees a
market economy and liberal democracy as the two preconditions for a stable peace,
misunderstands the process of transition from war to peace. Paris argues that it is
necessary to have ‘Institutionalization before Liberalization’, that is, to focus on
strong institutions, the rule of law and human rights protections before giving
post-conflict societies the right to have a say in their own aﬀairs. He argues that the
political process of democratic competition in a weak or failing state, or one making
a transition from war to peace, is likely to be counterproductive. This is because party
political competition is based on the idea of a conflict of interests, so this process
tends to exacerbate conflict and tension in society rather than ameliorating it, in a
context where fragile or failing states do not have the social, economic and legal
mechanisms necessary for ensuring that conflicts can be managed and contained.
Paris argues that democracy is fine for developed stable states but is destabilising
for states which are failing or are making the transition form war to peace. He asserts
that elections are important – the goal is the promotion of democracy after all – but
to achieve this end, elections must come second to state-building processes instituted
from the top-down. The process of political reconciliation and the development of a
shared sense of political community should precede competitive elections: ‘Peace-
builders should proceed with elections only when there is evidence that ‘‘moderate
20 Ibid, p. 405.
21 This point is drawn out in more detail in D. Chandler, ‘Anti-Corruption Strategies and
Democratization in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Democratization, 9:2 (2002), pp. 101–20.
22 R. Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conﬂict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
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parties’’ . . . have suﬃcient popular support . . . to prevail over ‘‘immoderate parties’’
at the polls.’23 This interventionist project attempts not merely to reconstruct a state
but also to transform the mindsets of the inhabitants of a post-conflict state. This
latter task is to be undertaken through a number of means: civil society-building; the
encouragement of cross-cutting links and interests; international attention to educa-
tional curricula from primary school through to university level; the strict control and
regulation of the media; trauma counselling and other therapeutic practices; and
through punishing political parties or elected representatives held to be ‘obstructing’
progress. Clearly this state-building agenda is an ambitious one, but one that in many
ways reflects the existing policy practices of international institutions, states and
non-governmental organisations on the ground in many parts of the world.24
Before engaging in a discussion about the eﬃciency of such interventionist
measures,25 the point to be stressed is the increasingly common-place assumption that
democracy is good for the Western powers but tutelage (‘the export of democracy’)
is better for states judged to be ‘under stress’, at ‘risk of failure’ or in post-conflict
‘recovery’. This assumption rests on a number of prior assumptions regarding the
role of the political process. The argument that it is possible to create the institutional
framework of a strong and stable state before liberalisation – that is, opening up the
political process to democratic competition – suggests that states and citizens can be
socially-engineered by correct practices of external regulation. The assumption is that
the problems of politics can be resolved outside the realm of the political, in the
realms of law, social policy and administration.26 It would seem, as Alejandro
Bendanˇa notes, that ‘good governance or state-building . . . has deep ideological
presumptions which purport to oﬀer technical solutions to what in essence are
political problems’.27
It is this view of ‘peace without politics’ that imbues much of the current
discussion around state-building practice which aspires to democratic ends.28 In
Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and other parts of the world, international administrators
argue that the rule of law and even ‘respect for democracy’ can be developed before
elected representatives can assume political responsibility. In the wake of the US-led
Iraq occupation, Bosnia’s High Representative Paddy Ashdown toured Western
23 Ibid., pp. 189–90.
24 See, for example, the state-building agendas laid out by the UN advisory panels, for example, the
Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), A/55/305-S/2000/809 (August 2000).
Available at: 〈http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/〉. See also the Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
25 For a more detailed examination of some of the problems with regard to Bosnia, see, for example,
D. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, 2nd edn. (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
26 The potential hubris of the desire to externally reshape ‘failed states’ in isolation from social forces,
is captured in the RAND Corporation recommendations for Iraq, which suggest that rather than
co-opt existing Iraqi institutions, the sounder approach is that of a ‘root and branch overhaul of
state and political structures’, involving ‘the creation of wholly new organizations at the local and
national levels and the recruitment, training, and management of new staﬀ’, America’s Role in
Nation-Building, p. 205.
27 A. Bendanˇa, ‘From Peace-Building to State-Building: One Step Forward and Two Backwards’,
presentation at ‘Nation-Building, State-Building and International Intervention: Between
‘Liberation’ and Symptom Relief’, CERI, Paris, 15 October 2004. See also, J. Demmers et al., Good
Governance in the Era of Global Neoliberalism: Conﬂict and Depolitisation in Latin America, Eastern
Europe, Asia and Africa (London: Routledge, 2004).
28 See, D. Chandler, ‘Introduction’, in Chandler (ed.), Peace without Politics? Ten Years of
State-Building in Bosnia (London: Routledge, 2005).
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capitals arguing that the ‘rule of law’ had to precede elections and political
liberalisation.29 This view of ‘sequencing’, which relegates the political process
behind that of law, policing and administration, inverts the traditional understanding
of the modern ‘rule of law’, derived from liberal democratic contract theory of
consent, in contrast to the arbitrary and unaccountable rule-making of elites.30 While
laws could be issued by right-wing or Soviet-style dictatorships, that also had the
prisons and the police to enforce them, these societies were not understood to be
operating under the ‘rule of law’ as law did not derive from popular consent but the
power of coercion. The assertion that the rule of law should come before political
liberalisation heralds a fundamental critique of one of the cornerstones of liberal
democratic theory.
This is the dilemma of exporting democracy. Democracy understood as premised
on ‘good governance’, the rule of law and the protection of human rights leaves little
room for the autonomy or self-determination of those to whom democracy is being
brought. Democracy is often presented as a solution to the problems of the political
sphere rather than as a process of determining and giving content to the ‘good life’.
It is ironic that government reforms imposed through the pressure of sanctions or
regime change from without tend to marginalise the capacity for choice of those who
are the ostensible subjects of these claims. The export of democracy in the context of
the low expectations, and indeed perceived dangers, of political autonomy has meant
that democracy promotion is increasingly seen as an ongoing process of regulation
and international control rather than one of ‘liberation’ or independence. Because
‘liberation’ in this instance is a grant of power rather than the recognition of a claim
of autonomy, the export of democracy goes hand-in-hand with greater regulatory
controls by international institutions or regulation by ad hoc groups of self-selecting
coalitions of the willing, such as the Contact Group, Stability Pact or Peace
Implementation Council (the ad hoc coalition to whom Bosnia’s ‘international’ High
Representative is accountable) .
War without politics?
The new international dispensation for military intervention and the undermining of
state sovereignty in the case of gross human rights abuses and the growing demand
for intervention to address the threats posed by ‘failed states’ has been reinforced by
a tendency for international theorists and international security actors to perceive
internal conflicts in the non-Western world as crimes to be judged and righted rather
than as political conflicts to be mediated.31 Kalevi Holsti captured this new
perception of conflict as ‘wars of the third kind’ where non-Western actors fought,
29 See, for example, Ashdown, ‘What Baghdad can learn from Bosnia’, Guardian, 22 April 2003; and
‘Broken Communities, Shattered Lives: Winning the Savage War of Peace’, speech to the
International Rescue Committee, London, 19 June 2003. Available at: 〈http://www.ohr.int/print/
?content_id=30130〉.
30 See further, D. Chandler, ‘The Problems of ‘‘Nation-Building’’: Imposing Bureaucratic Rule From
Above’, Cambridge Review of International Aﬀairs, 17:3 (2004), pp. 577–91.
31 See the excellent discussion in A. Columbo, ‘Asymetrical Warfare or Asymetrical Society? The
Changing Form of War and the Collapse of International Society’, in A. Gobbicchi (ed.),
Globalization, Armed Conﬂicts and Security (Rome: Cemiss-Rubbettino, 2004), pp. 111–27.
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not for social and political interests, as traditionally understood, but the desire for
diﬀerent community boundaries and a strengthening of a particularist identity. He
made the key point that these conflicts could not be dealt with in the traditional
manner of dealing with interstate conflict: ‘In these wars, ordinary cost-benefit
analyses that underlie wars as a ‘‘continuation of politics by other means’’ no longer
apply’.32 War in the non-Western world33 is seen as distinct from war waged by
Western powers; in the former case war no longer serves a legitimate political
purpose, it is not a means to an end, rather it is an end in itself.34
According to Antonio Cassese, former president of the international war crimes
tribunal at The Hague, for the people of non-Western states it is apparently ‘less a
noble clash of soldiers than the slaughter of civilians with machetes or firing squads,
the mass rape of women in special camps, the cowardly execution of non-
combatants’.35 As a human rights campaigners’ handbook Crimes of War: What the
Public Should Know asserts in its introduction:
Wars [involving non-Western states] today increasingly are fought not between armies
where oﬃcers are bound by notions of honour but by fighters . . . who are not soldiers in
the conventional sense of the word. The goal of these conflicts is often ethnic
cleansing – . . . not the victory of one army over another.36
No longer connected with rational political interests, it appears that conflict has a
dynamic of its own. Sussex University professor Martin Shaw makes the point that
for non-Western societies ‘genocide may be discerned, therefore, in relatively limited
mass killing’.37 He argues that ‘the concept of ‘‘genocidal massacre’’ should be
proposed to cover smaller incidents, which are often a prelude to a larger-scale
genocide’.38 The use of the emotive term ‘genocide’ to describe these conflicts
establishes them as qualitatively diﬀerent from the slaughter of wars in which
Western states are involved. Unlike war, which appears relatively more civilised in
comparison, ‘genocide’ is regarded as either inherently atavistic and irrational or as
morally evil.
This re-representation of non-Western conflict as driven by atavistic desires of
ethnic identity, economic crime and human rights abuse, rather than rational political
causes, has been held to illustrate the incapacity of non-Western states and peoples
and the need for international intervention. Mary Kaldor developed Holsti’s themes
with the concept of ‘New Wars’, which has become the ideological template for
current international security regimes.39 The concept of ‘new wars’ takes the politics
out of armed conflict in two ways, firstly the conflict or crisis in the non-Western state
is held to be the product of domestic or internal problems which are exacerbated by
32 K. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
33 Here I would include the Balkans, where conflict in the region has long been understood as a
product of cultural or civilisational attributes, which make the political process less rational and
shaped more by communal, ethnic or premodern identities. See, for example, M. Todorova,
Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); A. Burgess, Divided Europe: The
New Domination of the East (London: Pluto, 1997).
34 See also M. Shaw, On Slaughter: From War to Genocide (London: Polity Press, forthcoming),
chapter 1 (draft). Available at: 〈http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/slaughter1.htm〉.
35 A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, Modern Law Review, 61:1 (1998), p. 5.
36 R. Gutman and D. Rieﬀ, ‘Preface’, in Gutman and Rieﬀ (eds.), Crimes of War: What the Public
Should Know (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), p. 10.
37 Shaw, On Slaughter: From War to Genocide.
38 Ibid.
39 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (London: Polity Press, 1998).
484 David Chandler
rapacious or criminal elites which have no political legitimacy. Therefore the United
Nations’ Cold War approach of neutrality and respect for peace agreements drawn
up by the parties to the conflict no longer stands; instead, international actors are
held to be necessary to create and safeguard a just peace.
Secondly, and more importantly, politics is taken out of conflict by portraying the
intervention (military or otherwise) of Western powers as above politics. There is
alleged to be no self-interest at work in external intervention, rather it is equated with
the neutrality of policing; merely enforcing international or ‘cosmopolitan’ norms
and laws. Rather than war, there are crimes and human rights abuses (conflict in the
non-Western world) or there is policing and law enforcement (armed conflict
undertaken by Western powers).40 Neither non-Western state ‘failure’ nor the
international response to this are conceived in traditional terms of political interests.
This discursive dichotomy, between the failed state and the post-national or
post-political intervention, in one move, delegitimates the political process of the
state intervened in while at the same time setting up the intervening powers as being
beyond or above political interests.
Rather than the former UN position of being the Cold War neutral observers to
a legitimate conflict of interests, today’s international interveners assume on the
ground the self-appointed roles of judge, jury and administrator in a situation where
there are now alleged to be no legitimate interests which should be taken into
account. The ‘export of democracy’ depends on an assumption that greater external
regulatory power is disinterested, is purely facilitating the self-determination of those
to be ‘freed’. In the words of President Bush: ‘The rulers of outlaw regimes can know
that we still believe as Abraham Lincoln did: ‘‘Those who deny freedom to others
deserve it not for themselves; and, under the rule of a just God, cannot long retain
it.’’ ’41 Without the assumption of disinterestedness the power of liberation easily
becomes a licence for tyranny which can ‘deny freedom’, rather than grant it.
The relationship between external intervening powers (increasingly seen as
legitimate) and domestic political actors (now increasingly portrayed as pursuing
illegitimate interests) has been transformed through a succession of innovative
international policy shifts since the end of the Cold War. At the heart of this
transformation has been the United Nations itself, which has extended its remit and
reinterpreted the formal restrictions of the UN Charter while increasingly giving free
reign to self-selected ‘coalitions of the willing’ to set their own conditions on when
and how interventions should take place and be formally brought to an end.42 This
transformation in international practice has been shaped by the demands of the US
and its allies for a more interventionist remit from the UN, with UN Security Council
resolutions depending on the willingness of major powers to take action as a
precondition for UN resolutions in this sphere rather than following as a conse-
quence of them. The dangers of extending UN mandates and redefining the
parameters of Chapter VII interventions without securing member state consensus
40 See further, D. Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention
(London: Pluto Press, 2002).
41 Bush, ‘Inauguration Speech transcript’.
42 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, pp. 190–1. For an excellent survey see S. Chesterman,
Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
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has resulted in the fraying of the international legal order and the undermining of the
Security Council’s role in legitimising acts of military intervention.
The UN’s role has been transformed from that of ‘preventing war’ to the
post-conflict task of ‘constructing peace’. Over the last fifteen years, a process of
international administrative oversight and intervention, which developed in a
relatively arbitrary and ad hoc way, has been increasingly institutionalised. At the
end of 2004, the Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, advised
the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission to oversee the international
administration of failing and post-conflict states.43 According to the UN advisers and
the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a select committee of the ‘great and the good’
from around the world, acting under UN auspices, should have the requisite skills to
help coordinate a panoply of international intervention, from early warning, through
preventative action and onto post-conflict transitional administrations, where states
are ‘under stress or recovering from conflict’.44 While individual states and ad hoc
coalitions have been happy to unilaterally lead diplomatic and military interventions,
they have been less willing to unilaterally shoulder the costs of post-conflict
state-building, often leaving the UN to carry on the long-term work of democracy-
exporting and bear the blame for the failure of intervention to live up to its
justificatory promises.
The ‘ethical turn’ in international theorising
The rejection of the domestic political sphere as a vital constitutive sphere, in which
social and political bonds are constituted and strengthened, and the re-representation
of this sphere as essentially one of division and conflict, has received relatively little
critical evaluation from academic commentators involved in international relations
and international security studies. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, new
approaches to theorising security have stressed that states are part of the problem
rather than part of the solution to conflict and political and social division.45 Many
of these critical approaches draw on post-positivist theorising and follow Foucault’s
widely cited inversion of Clausewitz, seeing ‘politics as a continuation of war by other
means’.46 The existence of states, in this reading, is the result of war and domestic
social conflict, with the domination by victorious elites being enforced and repro-
duced by political processes of representation rather than military force. For these
43 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations, 2004). Available at:
〈http://www.un.org/secureworld/〉.
44 Ibid., p. 83.
45 See for example, K. Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, 17:4
(1991), pp. 313–26; K. Krausse and M. C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies (London: UCL
Press, 1997); K. Booth (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder. CO: Lynne
Reinner, 2005).
46 M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–76, trans. D.
Macey (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2003).
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theorists, states inevitably engage in war and internal conflict as they are based on
domination and relations of exclusion and exclusivity.47
For critical, post-positivist and normative theorists of international relations and
international security, the political sphere is the problem to be addressed, not the
sphere where solutions are to be found. Rather than starting from politics, from
social forces and the clash of interests in society, many theorists start from ethics and
norms and then seek to derive (non-exclusionary) political frameworks from this
basis.48 The approach of privileging ethics above the political process, central to the
‘ethical turn’ in international theorising, fits closely with international state-building
practices which privilege bureaucracy, law and administration above the political and
may in part explain why there is little critical focus on these developments in many
academic circles.49 Where ‘realist’ theorists often highlighted the autonomy of the
political and the limits to bureaucratic attempts to impose law and administration
over clashes of power and interest, today’s intellectual fashion is to focus on the
indeterminacy and socially constructed nature of power and interest, emphasising the
importance of norms and law.50
For realist theorists such as Edward H. Carr the extension of international law to
address international issues where there was no political consensus merely ‘debased
and discredited’ international law by bringing power relations into formal relations
of legal equality.51 As Milan University International Relations professor Alessandro
Colombo notes, the growth of international law has institutionalised the inequalities
of power:
. . . the just party always wins. Instead of the previous formal equality among states, the
tribunal-war dictates a clear asymmetry between the sanctioner and the sanctioned. The
party who acts in the name of law, democracy or, in extreme cases, mankind, cannot be
put in the same conditions as the party who is brought to trial.52
The advocacy of new international norms and of ‘cosmopolitan’ law has gone
hand-in-hand with the creation of a new international legal subject, usurping the
primacy of the sovereign state. This new legal subject is proclaimed to be the same
47 See, for example, D. Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); R. Keane, Reconstituting Sovereignty:
Post-Dayton Bosnia Uncovered (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).
48 See, for example, R. Falk, On Humane Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); D. Archibugi
and D. Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1995); A. Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1998).
49 Kenneth Minogue highlights the despotic dangers of ‘political moralism’, which sees autonomy and
independence – that is, the political sphere – as a barrier to ethically-derived notions of justice, and
argues that this approach to politics is especially strong in discussions of international relations. See,
for example, his Politics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),
pp. 104–5.
50 For ‘realist’ critiques of the privileging of law and administration above the political, see, for
example, the classic texts: E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2001); and H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New
York: McGraw-Hill Education, 1992), see especially ch. 3. For a more in-depth discussion, see D.
Chandler, Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004).
51 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 188.
52 Colombo, ‘Asymetrical Warfare or Asymetrical Society?’, p. 121. See also D. Chandler,
‘International Justice’, New Left Review, 2:6 (2000), pp. 55–66.
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subject as that of domestic law – the individual person – but as the bearer of human
rights rather than civil or democratic rights.
Human rights are at the centre of new ‘human security’ doctrines where the focus
is no longer on the defence of states but upon the rights of individuals wherever they
might be in the world. This is construed to be a moral or an ethical duty placed upon
the powerful to take responsibility for the protection of the rights of those
elsewhere.53 The 2004 Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security
Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, argues, for example, that: ‘A
human security approach for the European Union means that it should contribute to
the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of
the Union’s borders, as was the security approach of nation-states’.54 Here the
double-move of depoliticisation central to the export of democracy under the rubric
of ‘good governance’ can be clearly seen.
On the one hand, there is the creation of a new externally-constituted rights
subject, the object of the export of democracy, selectively judged to be ‘freedom-
loving’ or democratic. In Bush’s words: ‘it is the policy of the United States to seek
and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation
and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world’.55 This is the same
rights-subject as that advocated by earlier proponents of Wilsonian internationalism
under the Clinton administration. Mary Kaldor, for example, in her call that
international interveners should base their policies on the ‘bottom-up’ demands of
the same selected ‘freedom-loving’ subjects, asserts: ‘it is always possible to identify
local advocates of cosmopolitanism, people and places which refuse to accept the
politics of war – islands of civility’.56 The grant of rights from external actors does
not, of course, give the appointed or selected ‘freedom-loving’ people the right to
hold these external actors to account, or a right to assert their claims to political
autonomy, as can be seen in the international protectorate and semi-protectorate
regimes in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
On the other hand, it is assumed that the EU (making the same claim to the
projection of power as the US) has risen above the politics of state interests and that,
as a post-national or post-political constellation, it is capable of judging upon and
acting in the interests of ‘every individual’ regardless of which state they happen to
be a citizen. The EU is granted the right to decide which states are failing or denying
rights to their subjects and which people deserve support or intervention in their
name. This is in eﬀect, a right of unilateral intervention. The doctrine of ‘human
security’ imposes a duty or ‘responsibility’ of intervention which legitimises inter-
vention independently of the consensus-building mechanisms of the UN, one which
ultimately relies on power rather than traditional interstate mechanisms of inter-
national law. What appears to be a radical relation of empowerment and capacity-
building is, at heart, a new relationship of trusteeship or dominion.
53 See, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
54 Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe (Barcelona:
15 September 2004), p. 9. Available at: 〈http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/
Human%20Security%20Report%20Full.pdf〉.
55 Bush, ‘Inauguration Speech transcript’.
56 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 120.
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Robert Cooper, policy advisor to UK prime minister Tony Blair and the EU High
Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, has most successfully translated the projec-
tion of power into non-political ethics in his assertion of the division of the world into
postmodern, modern and premodern states. Postmodern states, such as European
ones, and to a certain extent the US, are held to have rejected the idea of national
interests as a motivation for foreign policy and be driven instead by domestic
concerns of the values of the ‘good life’, such as democracy and justice – they have
no traditional political interests at stake in intervention. At the same time, the parts
of the world where states are failing and democracy needs to be exported cannot be
treated as political equals. As Cooper states, the postmodern state:
. . . needs to get used to the idea of double standards. Among themselves, the post-modern
states operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with
more old-fashioned kinds of state outside the post-modern limits, Europeans need to revert
to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is
necessary . . . In the jungle, one must use the laws of the jungle.57
Cooper uses the language of post-political, post-national foreign policy based on
global ethics and neo-Wilsonian values but at the same time recognises that these
values – or the interventionist policies held to be a consequence of them – are not
held by more than a minority of ‘post-modern’ states. Where realists, such as
Morgenthau or Carr, would suggest that the pursuit of these values in a divided
world would inflame conflict, Cooper asserts that this can be avoided as long as the
postmodern states have an ‘enduring strategic superiority’ of the sort aspired to in the
US National Security Strategy.58
The irony of neo-Wilsonian democracy-promotion and state-building is that in the
course of the struggle to prevent (non-Western) state sovereignty from giving
impunity to tyrants and human rights-abusing governments other (Western/
postmodern) states have acquired much greater sovereign powers to intervene in the
domestic aﬀairs of other states. Democracy-promotion rather than levelling the
unequal playing-field of the global order, clearly risks institutionalising new hierar-
chies of power and the return to the pre-UN era of Westphalian ‘might makes right’.
The UN High-Level Panel Report, referred to above, in fact explicitly awards might
with the badge of righteousness, suggesting that when it comes to the new tasks of
external state-building, ‘all those in a position to help others . . . [have] the
responsibility to do so.’59
Politics as a barrier to peace
Today’s export of democracy occurs in a context of much diminished expectations
for non-Western states in the wake of the perceived failure (for the most part) in the
57 R. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London:
Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 62
58 Ibid., p. 65.
59 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, p. 18; see
also D. Chandler, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the ‘‘Liberal Peace’’?’, International
Peacekeeping, 11:1 (2004), pp. 59–81.
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experiment in post-colonial independence.60 The dominant consensus is that this
failure lies largely with the political sphere in these ‘failing states’ – positing the
solution as one of ‘good governance’ overseen by external intervention. There is
therefore a tendency for international interveners to separate the export of democ-
racy and post-conflict state-building from the process of domestic politics in the state
intervened in; a tendency to see state-building as a ‘scientific’, technical or adminis-
trative process which does not require a process of popular consensus-building to
give the target population a stake in policymaking. Where the post-World War II
external administrations of Germany and Japan engaged the local populations in a
major project of social, economic and political reconstruction, and through doing so
won a high-level of popular legitimacy and support, international administrations,
such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, have excluded all but token local input
into the making and implementation of policy.
In the Balkans, the international administrations have not just operated above the
sphere of representative politics but have also consistently criticised the programmes
and personnel of the main political parties and argued that both the Bosnian and
Kosovan electorate are not yet to be trusted with a meaningful vote. In the course of
‘exporting democracy’, rather than deriving policy from local concerns and needs,
the legislative process has been driven by technical and administrative ‘experts’ in
Brussels and Washington. Policies have then been imposed through the international
Oﬃce of the High Representative in Bosnia and the UN’s head of mission in Kosovo.
Locally accountable political leaders then must accede to these demands, under the
threat of being dismissed on the grounds of ‘obstruction’.
There has been a trend towards granting external administrative powers greater
and greater remits of authority. This process is reflected in the Bosnian example,
where close international oversight was intended to last for one year only, until the
first state elections in September 1996. However, ten years on from Dayton, not one
piece of substantial legislation has been devised, written and enacted by Bosnian
politicians and civil servants.61 This is in marked contrast to Japan and West
Germany where, in the first case, the external occupation lasted nearly seven years
and, in the latter, there was four years of occupation and full control over industrial
and security policy was returned ten years after the end of the war.62
More than a decade on from the Dayton settlement of the Bosnian conflict, the
lack of political autonomy for Bosnian representatives, and of political account-
ability for Bosnian citizens, is possibly the most remarkable feature of current
state-building practices, in this tiny and fragmented state. However, the lack of
democracy in Bosnia has posed little barrier in the negotiations over the accession
process towards European Union membership, in fact, the European Union has
60 See, for example, R. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); also Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War.
61 For further reading on the post-Dayton international regime see the website of the international
Oﬃce of the High Representative. Available at: 〈http://www.ohr.int/〉. See also Chandler, Bosnia:
Faking Democracy after Dayton; E. M. Cousens and C. K. Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia:
Implementing the Dayton Accords (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); D. Sololovic´ and F. Bieber
(eds.), Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2001); S. Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (London:
Hurst & Co, 2002).
62 For background on postwar state-building in Germany and Japan, see for example, J. W. Dower,
Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); D. G.
Williamson, Germany from Defeat to Partition, 1945–1963 (London: Longman, 2001).
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given its formal blessing to the maintenance of a highly restricted political sphere,
with the establishment of the EU’s Special Representative as the ‘double-hatted’
international High Representative in 2002. There would appear to be a clear
international consensus that, for state-building and democracy-promotion to be a
success, rule by externally-appointed bureaucrats is preferential to rule by Bosnian
representatives accountable to Bosnian citizens.
It could be argued that George W. Bush’s second inaugural speech proclaiming the
importance of the export of democracy and the ten years of state-building experience
in Bosnia serves as a potent symbol highlighting the return of liberal faith in the
science of law and administration, reminiscent of the interwar period of the last
century. This is also evidenced in the return of the idea of conditional sovereignty,
muted for Kosovo by the Independent International Commission, and the idea of
‘sovereignty as responsibility’, suggested by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty.63 The concept of unequal rather than reciprocal
relations between sovereign states is reminiscent of the Versailles restrictions on the
sovereignty of the new states established in central and eastern Europe. In addition,
there is clearly a renewed faith in the powers of international conferences and
committees to establish the borders of states (the European Community Badinter
Commission did this for the former Yugoslavia), to appoint external governors (as
the Peace Implementation Council did for Bosnia and the United Nations for
Kosovo), and to detail exhaustive recommendations of good governance as a
condition for reciprocal relations in the international sphere. There is without doubt
a growing consensus that international experts and bureaucrats can better govern a
country than politicians accountable to the people who have to live with the
consequences of their policymaking.
There is another similarity to the era of Woodrow Wilson, the rejection of
traditional ideas of empire. In our post-colonial era, there is little support for the
return of direct forms of international regulation, for a new network of colonial
protectorates bringing ‘order’ to the regions of the world threatened by failing states.
Rather, new international administrative regimes are, in the terminology of Michael
Ignatieﬀ, most often run on the basis of ‘Empire Lite’.64 International administrators
are loath to take any responsibility for, or to be held to account for, the policies they
pursue or the outcome of their interventions into the political process.
At the same time, local actors are denied the political autonomy to reach their own
compromise solutions and assume accountability themselves. Both Bosnia and
Kosovo painfully highlight the contradictions of having regularly contested elections
at state and provincial levels and, alongside this, the existence of a parallel
administration headed by unaccountable international appointees with the power to
draw up and impose legislation and sack elected oﬃcials. But these protectorate
63 See, for example, Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Why Conditional
Independence: The Follow up of the Kosovo Report (Solna, Sweden: Tryckeriet Åsbrink Grafiska,
2001). Available at: 〈http://kulturserver-hamburg.de/home/illyria/
kosovocommission.org_report_english_2001.pdf〉; R. N. Haass, ‘Sovereignty: Existing Rights,
Evolving Responsibilities: Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for
International Studies’, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 14 January 2003. Available at:
〈http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm〉. See also, Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty.
64 M. Ignatieﬀ, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage,
2003).
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relations of external regulation in the cause of democracy-promotion and state-
building are merely the most transparent end of a continuum of new hierarchical
relations transferring the mechanisms of good governance, for example, those from
Brussels to the capitals of EU candidate members and states engaged in negotiations
for the precursor to accession, the Stabilisation and Association process.65
Under new international mechanisms of democracy-promotion and state-
building, the political process is squeezed from above and below. There is an
increasingly diminished accountability for policymaking either domestically or
internationally. In this sense the borders between the domestic and international are
being eﬀectively erased. However, democracy-promotion has done little to promote
democracy. For example, the external regulation of the people of Bosnia and Kosovo
as ‘humans’ – rather than as ‘citizens’ with rights of political equality – has done little
to overcome the ‘politics of exclusion’. Bosnian and Kosovan political representa-
tives who have been elected are accountable to international overseers rather than to
their voters, reducing political institutions to irrelevant talking shops. In this context,
elections are not a judgement on government policies; in fact, the inverse relationship
is in play. Elections are openly seen as educational exercises where, in the process of
exporting democracy, the voters submit themselves to the judgement of the inter-
national administrators as to their political capacities as citizens.
A few international analysts have stood out against the view that the political
process can be short-cut or replaced by bureaucratic and administrative edict. Amitai
Etzioni and Francis Fukuyama have, for example, questioned ‘over-ambitious
societal engineering’.66 However, for these authors, as for left-wing historian Eric
Hobsbawn, the ‘dangers of exporting democracy’ have been held to be the
over-optimistic aims of today’s ideologically-driven neo-Wilsonians.67 This critique,
in fact, agrees on the essentials with the current practices of international state-
building, suggesting that the process of spreading democracy is not straightforward,
but diﬀers in the importance attached to the ambitious aims involved.
Critics who argue that democracy and state-building necessarily imply
autonomy – and believe that the export of democracy when translated into ‘good
governance’ regimes is contradictory – are much thinner on the ground. Gerald
Knaus and others at the Brussels-based think-tank, the European Stability Initiative,
have attempted to initiate a debate on the ‘Travails of the European Raj’ in Bosnia,
highlighting the limitations of the high-handed approach taken to post-conflict
reconstruction.68 William Bain has also challenged the ‘New Paternalism’ of the
failed states discourse and highlighted the return of a more hierarchical world order
with the institutionalisation of new forms of political inequality between states and
65 For more information on the Stabilisation and Association process, see ‘The EU’s Actions in
Support to the Stabilisation & Association Process’, available at: 〈http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/see/actions/〉. See also, the powers of the new international regulatory regimes for
many African states, to be established under the ten year UN Millennium Development Goals:
Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights For All, 2005. Chapter 2, ‘Freedom from Want’. Available at: 〈http://www.un.org/
largerfreedom/chap2.htm〉.
66 A. Etzioni, ‘A Self-Restrained Approach to Nation-Building by Foreign Powers’, International
Aﬀairs, 80:1 (2004), p. 15; see also Fukuyama, State-Building, p. 123.
67 E. Hobsbawn, ‘The Dangers of Exporting Democracy’, Guardian, 22 January 2005, p. 22.
68 See, for example, G. Knaus and F. Martin, ‘Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the
European Raj’, Journal of Democracy, 14:3 (2003), pp. 60–74; see also the European Stability
Initiative website at: 〈http://www.esiweb.org/〉.
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between individuals.69 Simon Chesterman’s study of post-conflict international
administrations points out that today’s international rule over Bosnia and Kosovo
provides even less local accountability than the last century’s mandate system or that
under the presently defunct UN Trusteeship Council.70 Chesterman’s in-depth
comparative study also concludes that current international state-building practices
are prone to a number of fundamental flaws which stem from the inequalities built
into the relationship of political pedagogy and external regulation: the means are
often inconsistent with the declared ends; the resources are often inadequate to
achieve the ends sought; and finally, much policymaking is more declaratory than
practical, being largely irrelevant to the tasks at hand.71
Conclusion
It is necessary to extend this discussion of the questions and contradictions raised by
international state-building and ‘democracy promotion’ in the specific ‘post-imperial’
context of our times. In the case of Bosnia, for example, where a large amount of
resources have been committed by the international community, it is undoubtedly
true that external intervention has had a major impact on the political process on the
ground. Without doubt, it is possible to have inter-communal peace and a high-level
of refugee return72 without democracy or the autonomy of the political sphere.73
Dayton itself established that peace could be achieved through the external
pressure of military intervention and economic and political sanctions. This external
pressure created a state, but one with no real basis in Bosnian society and little
popular legitimacy. Since Dayton, external administrators have built some roads and
schools, issued banknotes, restructured and re-restructured governing institutions,
provided incentives for refugee return, banned some political parties or removed their
elected leaders, and pushed through a wide range of policy decisions in a multitude
of spheres. The successful assertion of external influence is hardly surprising
considering the small size of the Bosnian state and the relatively limited ambition of
the international economic and social rebuilding programmes.
However, it is also becoming apparent that state-building requires more than the
largess – and coercive power – of external benefactors. Ten years after Dayton, the
Bosnian state still lacks a secure basis in Bosnian society and commands little social
or political legitimacy. While the international administration has been able to
institute a large number of administrative and policy reforms to meet the externally-
decided needs of ‘good governance’, it has been unable to transform the social and
economic conditions of the population or to establish Bosnian institutions of
government – that is, those institutions which are crucial to legitimising the Bosnian
69 W. Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
70 S. Chesterman, You, the People: the United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 45.
71 Ibid, pp. 238–49.
72 For figures on refugee return, see 〈http://www.unhcr.ba/return/index.htm〉.
73 This is a best-case example: in Kosovo the internationally-administered peace has not facilitated the
return of ethnic-minority refugees, as in Bosnia, while Iraq under international administration failed
even to achieve peace.
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state and are capable of overcoming the divisions of the war. In this respect, the
international experiment in state-building without democracy, or viewing democracy
as an end instead of as a means, has revealed major shortcomings.
The irony is that the shortcomings of this approach are rarely seen as inherent
limitations of the framework of exporting and ‘imposing’ democracy. The inter-
national policymakers engaged in democracy-promotion and state-building, in fact,
seem to see their limited success as evidence of the diﬃculties of bringing democracy
to non-Western states, and in this sense justifying their work. It is this disillusionment
with democracy which suggests that we are not witnessing a full return to the idealism
of the interwar period. There appears to be little sense of belief that the international
exporters of democracy will succeed in creating strong independent states which have
a right to political and legal equality with the states that currently administer or
advise them.74
Rather than transforming the states that are the objects of democracy-promotion
and state-building, international policy is more of a holding operation, designed to
regulate and install mechanisms which are capable of ‘trouble-shooting’ should
political autonomy prove problematic. Unlike the interwar period, it may be that the
export of democracy says more about low expectations and a lack of US mission or
desire to change the world, despite the rousing rhetoric of George W. Bush’s second
inaugural speech.
74 See, for example, S. D. Krasner, ‘The Case for Shared Sovereignty’, Journal of Democracy, 16:1
(2005), pp. 69–83; R. Keohane, ‘Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty’,
in J. L. Holzgrefe and R. O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political
Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 275–98; and more generally, D.
Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building (London: Pluto Press, 2006).
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